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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
BILLS I ROOFING INC. I 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SALT LAH CITY SCHOOL 
DISTRICT, 
Case No. 15346 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
This is an action brought by plaintiff roofing company 
against the defendant school district based upon an alleged 
breach of contract concerning the roofing of a local high 
school. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A trial was held before the Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, 
Jr., District Judge of the Third Judicial District. The case 
was submitted to the jury on special interrogatories and a 
judgment was subsequently entered in favor of plaintiff in the 
apµroximate sum of $14,000. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-appellant seeks a reversal of the trial court 
judgment 2nd an order by this Court finding in favor of defen-
n'~, +,er- cf law. In the alternative defendant seeks 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an action corrunenced by plaintiff · 
against the i,, 
Lake City School District for defendant's alleged breach o:. 
contract concerning a roofing project to be performed on Hi: 
land High School, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Plaintiff initiated its complaint against defendant or 
February 5, 1975 alleging that defendant wrongfully removec 
the plaintiff from the Highland High School roofing project, 
Plaintiff sought damages in the amount of $19, 765. (P.., pr. 
2-4). 
Defendant answered plaintiff's complaint and alleged t• 
plaintiff failed to complete the project in compliance wit: 
the agreements, standards and specifications of the projec: 
and failed to perform in an expeditious and workmanlike rn~~: 
(R., pp. 14-16). 
On April 2 7 plain tiff responded to defendant's reques: 
for admissions and at that time stated that the original 11'· 
ten contract entered into between the parties had been modi' 
by an oral agreement. (R., p. 40). 
Trial was commenced before a j ur:' on May 9, 1977 wit:i. 
Honorable Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. presiding. Much of the t,,. 
timony and many of the exhibits were undisputed. The fol'.: 
ing is a synopsis of the undisputed facts and evidence '''' 
-2-
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at trial. 
on June 17, 1974 the Salt Lake City School District 
sent to plaintiff roofing company a request to bid for se-
veral school buildings in the Salt Lake City District. (Ex-
hibit 1-P). Subsequently, plaintiff submitted its bid for 
the Ensign School, Highland High School, and Uintah School. 
(Exhibit 6-P). On July 9, 1974 plaintiff was awarded the 
contract and purchase orders were accordingly issued. (Ex-
hibit 7-P I 8-P I 9-P). 
At the time of the bid and at the time of the subsequent 
acceptance the district had issued "basic specifications for 
re-roofing" concerning the standards to be utilized by the 
roofing contractor during the projects. (Exhibit 3-P). Para-
graph 11 of the specifications stated: 
Protection of building from water damage: 
During all stages of the project, care 
must be exercised to prevent damage to 
rooms and corridors below and the building 
proper. No roofing material shall be ap-
plied over damp felts. At the end of 
each working day the roof shall be sealed 
to prevent water damage to the building 
and its contents. 
Plaintiff did not receive authorization to proceed on 
t~e project until August 19, 1974 when it was decided by the 
Board of Education that insulation would not be purchased and 
added at the time the roofing job was performed. A letter 
'las seont t_,_, ,ll 1iriti ff advising it to proceed as originally 
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planned. (Exhibit 11-P; Tr., p. 12). 
Plaintiff began working on the prcject on a small 
area of the building. (Tr., p. 13). Subsequently in 0 1 etc-
ber of 1974 it was decided that additional insulation sho~L 
be replaced and the Board of Education authorized the 
exp en-
diture of additional money for this insulation. An additio:. 
$21,804 was thereby added to the original contract of $2 9 ,~ 
making the total cost of the project $51,604. (Exhibit 13-; 
Tr., p. 15). 
Walter A. Jensen, the Board's inspector, checked ontr0 
progress of the project almost every day. (Tr., p. 77). Or. 
October 17, 1974 Jensen had a conversation with sevenl~ 
plaintiff's employees concerning the procedure which plaint: 
wished to utilize. (Tr. I pp. 77 I 95). At that time Ken a1:. 
informed Mr; Jensen that he wished to tear off a large area 
of the roof rather than working on small portions ea~d~ 
for the purpose of speeding up the project. He informed j::· 
sen that he would obtain a large crew from a local church t: 
assist him. (T 82 9697) Jensenwasinformedat r •I PP• I - • 
that time that visqueen plastic would be kept on hand to cc 
the area. (Tr., p. 97). For the next five days the crews 
proceeded to tear off the old roofing material until approx:· 
t) had bee 
mately 44 squares (each square is 100 square fee 
removed. (Tr., p. 96). 
-4-
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Plaintiff's own witnesses testified that the roof was 
not "sealed" at the time the first rainstorm occurred. Rus-
sel Bills, brother of the owner Ken Bills, testified that 
prior to the storm the roof was left wide open. (Tr., p. 99). 
He further testified that on the morning of the storm the 
roof was covered with visqueen but was not sealed. (Tr., p. 
103). Scott Bruderer, an employee of plaintiff, testified 
that the roof was not sealed but could have been with tar and 
paper prior to the rainstorm but such procedure would have 
taken time and would have been expensive. (Tr., p. 111). 
Donald Bills, brother of Ken Bills, testified that vis-
queen was not water tight and could not be used to seal the 
roof. Finally, Kenneth Bills, the president of the plaintiff 
roofing company testified that three days prior to the first 
rainstorm the roof was not sealed and that rain was subsequently 
~le to get through the visqueen. (Tr., pp. 196-197). 
Carl Paulsen; a contractor involved in the roofing busi-
ness since 195~ testified in the roofing business the word 
"seal" means to join the new roof to the old roof in such a 
manner that it is absolutely water-tight. He further stated 
that it was the custom of all builders in the industry to 
seal the work as it was being done. (Tr., pp. 299-300) • 
On the night of October 20 one of plaintiff's employees 
" l i ~rht rai_n beginning and contacted other employees 
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of plaintiff who then converged upon the school r f 
- oo ana ;, 
the visqueen plastic over the exposed areas. (Tr., p. 101. 
The next morning, October 21, 1974, water had penetrated ::: 
the visqueen plastic and was flooding into the third s~~ 
school rooms. (Tr., pp. 108, 226). Ceiling tiles were 50,. 
and falling off the ceiling, wood paneling was wet and~, C .•. 
and seal brick was peeling. (Tr., p. 212). 'l'hewatercon;. 
to leak into the classrooms for several days thereafter. ":: 
p. 236). Throughout the next two weeks it frequently rain,: 
and on several occasions water leaked heavily into the schc:. 
(Tr., pp. 46-47, 227). Some of the classrooms were moved:: 
other areas of the building for a two-week period. (Tr.,;. 
238). 
At various times after the initial October 21 leakage o 
ployees of plaintiff worked upon the roof. On November 5, 
1974 a letter was sent by Mr. Bruce Ririe to plaintiff out· 
lining the school district's dissatisfaction with plaintiff': 
work and informing plaintiff that the contract would be car.· 
celled "unless the new roof is installed where the old was::: 
off and the roof leaks caused by your crews repaired by Sa":· 
day, November 9, 1974 so there is no further water damage;:.· 
side the building". (Exhibit 19-P). The roof was finally 
sealed on November 11 but was not completed until the firs: 
week in December. 
-6-
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on approximately the 10th of November Mr. Ririe in-
formed Kenneth Bills that he was terr.1inating the contract but 
that he would pay them for everything that had already been 
done including all materials on the job. (Tr., p. 172). On 
November 25, 1974 plaintiff sent a bill to defendant school 
board requesting a balance due of $18,916.00. (Exhibit 22-P). 
Defendant responded to this letter with his own calculations 
showing a balance to be paid of $9,378.00. (Exhibit 2 6-P) • 
several areas of dispute arose in the lawsuit. One of 
these areas concerns the number of square feet actually worked 
upon by the plaintiff and the cost involved in the project. 
Because appellant is not raising the determination of damages 
as error testimony concerning damages will be omitted. 
The main issue in dispute was whether the conduct of de-
fendant's agents waived the requirement of sealing the roof. 
It was plaintiff's theory throughout the trial that the 
school board's building inspector and director of buildings 
and grounds were aware that an extremely large amount of the 
roof would be uncovered at a time but agreed to the procedure 
in order to expedite the project. Russell Bills stated that 
hQ informed Mr. Jensen, the defendant inspector, of the pro-
posed plan and that Jensen "told us that it would be all right 
~ tear it off and to go ahead without covering it each night". 
Bills told .1°·1c-•~11 that visqueen would be available if neces-
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(Tr. , p. 97) • Donald Bill, oho T 
i 
stated that Jensen agreed that because of the slowness in,,,., 
"•, 
sary to cover the area. 
mal procedures it would be all right to tear out the la~e 
area as long as there was material to cover the roof availc;_ 
(Tr. , p. 116) • 
Ken Bills stated that around the 6th or 7th of October.·. 
visited Mr. Ririe in his office and told him that the work 
would be a lot faster if large sections could be torn off an,: 
reroofed as a whole. (Tr., p. 151). Bills stated that Ririe 
told him that if the visqueen was on the project that the pie 
would be all right. (Tr., p. 164). 
Defendant's witnesses testified quite differently. fu, 
Ririe testified that he never authorized his inspector, Mr. 
Jensen, to waive the requirement of sealing the roof a~~~ 
no one under his position had any authority to waive this p:r· 
vision. He further stated that any waiver of a departmental 
provision issued by the Board of Education would have to cc~e 
through him personally and that no such waiver was ever re-
ceived. (Tr., pp. 44-45). 
Mr. Ririe could not recall ever talking to Ken Bills ai'. 
the proposed mass assault on the building and stated that Hi 
first time he heard about the project and the use of visqueo 
was when his inspector told him that he was opposed to usi"g 
it. This occurred around the 18th or 19th of October. 
p. 246). 
-8-
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He further testified that he was skeptical about the 
Vl·squeen and told Jensen to inform plaintiff that a use of 
So lution had to be found since he did not think it better 
could be sealed effectively. He told Jensen to inform the 
contractor that the building had to be protected. (Tr., pp. 
24 7-249). He stated that he had the power to modify the type 
of r,;~terial and dates of completion but could not modify in-
crease in prices or protecting of the buildings. (Tr., p. 
250) • 
Walter A. Jensen, supervising inspector of the mainten-
m~ of the defendant school district, testified that he was 
told by Mr. Bills of the proposed plan to rip off a large 
uea of the roof in order to expedite the project. He testi-
fied as follows: 
So I said, well, that the responsibility 
is yours, in effect not the exact conver-
sation, I said you can't open that much 
roof off and leave it open, you've got to 
seal it, you've got to cover it and in 
our discussion I proposed it first that 
he put on two plys of asphalt and membrane 
to seal it and both of us were aware that 
that was a costly procedure to do and he 
said, well, we are insured. I said I 
don't want any hassle with insurance com-
panies or anyone else, I don't want any 
water getting through the roof. (Tr., p. 
82) • 
Jensen further told Bills that the use of visqueen would be 
rio\·· b 
•· 
1 ecause any perforation in the plastic would cause a 
-9-
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leak and additionally the wind was powerful in that ar , ] 
ea or.c 
could easily blow it off. Finally, he suggested that Bill: 
contact other roofers in the area as to what procedure to,_ 
Joe, 
Jensen testif;ed that he thought Bills' suggesti'on 
"" was mere] 
a proposal that would be examined and submitted to Mr. Ririe 
before it was actually undertaken. (Tr., p. 84). He did 
not again see Ken Bills until after the storm. (Tr., p. 8~) 
Subsequently on the 17th of October he had a discussion 
with Don Bills concerning the open roof. Bills told h~ 
that a storm was forecast for Tuesday and Jensen told Bills 
he had better get it sealed up. Jensen stated that he gave 
him no instructions because it was the contractor's responsi· 
bility and how he accomplished it was his business as long'' 
he met the requirement of keeping the building safe. (Tr., 
p. 273). 
Ken Bills substantiated this statement and agreed that 
he was never told by anyone that he was not responsible for 
preventing water from entering the building. (Tr., p. 192), 
Finally, Russell Bills testified that he considered it 
his responsibility to prevent the elements from getting intc· 
a building and that it was a necessary workmanlike procedure 
to protect a building. (Tr., p. 101). 
In the beginning of the trial plaintiff's attorney ur!' 
that conversations with the building inspector and Mr. pir:• 
-10-
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dmissible because they went to a modification of the were a 
written contract. Defendant's counsel had previously objected 
conversations were irrelevant in that they violated that sucn 
the parol evidence rule and attempted to modify the contract. 
(e.g. Tr., p. 165). The trial court rejected this modifica-
tion theory. (Tr., pp. 305-306). In a discussion by the 
Court with counsel the first concept of waiver was suggested 
by the Judge. (Tr., pp. 159-160). Throughout the proceeding 
defendant's counsel argued that there was no notice given to 
defendant of any waiver theory prior to the middle of the 
trial. (Tr., pp. 306, 324). 
Before submission of the case to the jury defendant moved 
for a directed verdict on the grounds that plaintiff's failure 
to seal the roof and the subsequent delay was a material breach 
of contract as a matter of law. (Tr., p. 307). The Court took 
the motion under advisement. (Tr., p. 314). 
Special interrogatories were submitted to the jury of 
which the first question asked the following: 
Did the actions of the plaintiff in late 
October and early November of 1974, in re-
moving a portion of the roofing on High-
land High School, and the manner in which 
it was left, constitute a material breach 
of the contract between plaintiff and de-
fendant? 
The jury answered "no". (R., p. 130). 
~ juJ~ment was entered by the trial court pursuant to 
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the verdict on May 23, 1977 together with the following 
tional finding: 
In addition to findings of the jury as above 
set forth, the Court made the following find-
ings based upon the undisputed evidence at 
trial: 
(1) The actions of the defendant in late 
October and early November of 1974, 
in removing plaintiff from the Highland 
High School project and thus prevent-
ing it from completing the contract, 
constituted a breach of the contract 
between plaintiff and defendant. (Tr. 
pp. 140-141). 
l 
addi- ' 
On June 22, 1977 the trial court denied defendant's mo-
ti on for directed verdict, for a judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and for a new trial. (R., p. 148). 
On July 21, 1977 this appeal was filed. (R., p. 152), 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RULE 
AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT PLAINTIFF BREACHED 
ITS CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT. 
The development of this lawsuit can be simply stated: 
Plaintiff sued defendant for breach of contract alleging de-
fendant had wrongfully terminated plaintiff from the roofing 
project and asked damages for the profits it would have re· 
ceived had the contract been completed. 
Defendant school district answered this claim by alleq· 
ing that it was justified in terminating the contrac;; bee'<-'> 
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r,,, ' breach committed by plaintiff in its failure to pro-
of tne 
1 . -eal the roof as required by the specific contractual ?er Y ~ 
_1· 0 n and its subsequent failure to protect the building JrOVl::i -
as was also required by the contract. 
Finally, plaintiff attempted to counter this defense on 
two theories. In the beginning of the trial, plaintiff urged 
that the cuntract had been orally modified by the actions of 
the defendant's agents. After this theory was rejected by 
~e trial court a new theory was suggested by the court to 
plaintiff's counsel that the contractual provisions regarding 
sealing and protection of the building had been "waived" by 
the defendant and therefore it was unable to claim a breach 
under the sealing provision of the original contract. 
As to the question of whether defendant breached its 
contract by termination the trial court found that based upon 
undisputed evidence at trial the termination of plaintiff 
roofing company constituted a breach of the contract. This 
conclusion of law by the trial court was correct since a re-
pudiation is necessarily a breach of contract. 
However, if plaintiff had materially breached its con-
tract by failing to seal the roof then the defendant school 
district was discharged from performing its obligation under 
the contract and its breach was therefore excused. Restate-
]ent of -. ------"'_'.:'_ti~rac::_~s, §397, p. 750. 
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... 
Despite repeated assertions by defendant that h 
t is se. 
cond question of plaintiff's breach could be decided by 
court as a matter of law the issue was submitted to the, 
)'::. 
by special interrogatories. (R., p. 130). The trial cou:: 
erred in submitting this question to the jury since the fa:: 
relied upon by defendant to justify plaintiff's breach "'~'° 
equally undisputed as in the instance of facts relied ~~ 
for defendant's breach. The only question before the tria'. 
court was whether the provision of the contract requiring 
sealing of the roof and protection of the building had beer. 
violated. This was clearly a question of law before the cc:: 
and it was therefore error to submit this legal question tc 
the jury. 
The rule delineating the role of a judge and jury has 
been stated as follows: 
The question of what facts will consti-
tute a breach of contract is one of law 
to be determined by the court, but whe-
ther such facts have occurred is ordin-
arily a question of fact to be determined 
by the jury. Thus, when the facts are un-
disputed, the question whether there has 
been a performance or a breach of the 
contract is one of law for the court. 
17A C.J.S., Contracts, §630, p. 1266. 
(Emphasis added). 
This Court in Avgikos v. Lowry, 179 P.988 (Utah, 19 191 
applied this rule in a case involving the question of wnet:,· 
a supplier had substantially complied with the quantit:· '' 
-14-
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agreed to in a contract. This court stated: goods 
Where the facts are undisputed, the ques-
tion of whether or not they constitute 
a performance or a breach of the contract 
is one of law for the court. Id. at 990. 
~15 court concluded, "It was error to submit the question to 
the jury, on the allegations and the facts as they appear, as 
to whether there had been a compliance with the contract." Id. 
at 99 0. 
It is a well-settled rule of construction that where the 
terms of the contract are not in dispute, the language is clear 
and unambiguous, and the facts and circumstances are not dis-
?uted, construction of the contract is a question of law and 
the question of whether the facts constitute performance under 
the contract is also a question of law for the court. Brown-
Crurnrner Inv. Co. v. Koss Const. Co., 4 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1925). 
It is universally held to be error to subrni t the construction 
of a written contract to a jury. Hewitt v. Buchanan, 4 S. W. 2d 
169 (Ct. Civ. App. Tex. 1927). 
The standard of appellate review in a case such as this 
lias been stated by the court of appeals of Arizona in Karnmert 
~os. Enterprises v. Tanque Verde Praza Co., 420 P.2d 592 (Ariz • 
. i.pp, 1966). The court stated: 
In a breach of contract case, the burden 
of proof is on the plaintiff to plead and 
prove a breach. The question of whether 
a contract has been breached is ordinarily 
a aucstion for the jury, but, if the undis-
-15-
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puted material facts in the case, togeth~r 
with evidence taken most favorably to sup-
port the judgment below established that a 
judgment other than that rendered below is 
mandated by applicable law, the appellate 
court should set aside the lower court's 
judgment ar.d enter the appropriate judgment. 
Id. at 603. 
In the instant case the contractual provision upon wh:: 
defendant school district relied in its repudiation of ~e 
contract is clear and undisputed. This provision stated: 
In all stages of the project, care must be 
exercised to prevent damage to rooms and 
corridors below and the building proper. 
No roofing material shall be applied over 
damp felts. At the end of each working 
day, the roof shall be sealed to prevent 
water damage to the building and its con-
tents. (Ex. 3-P). (Emphasis added). 
There is no ambiguity or doubt that the word "seal" means b:. 
the roof was required to be watertight. The meaning of pla1:. 
and ordinary words in common use is a question of law for tr.' 
court. 17A C.J.S., Contracts, §620, p. 1259. Employees of 
the plaintiff admitted throughout the trial that the roof ·•a0 
not sealed at the time of the rainstorms and that 44 squares 
which consisted of 4, 400 square feet were left "unsealed". 
pp. 99, 103, 111, 124, 196). 
Thus as a matter of law plaintiff breached it:s cont:ac: 
by failing to seal this large area and exposing the buildi:<~ 
to water damage. In addition, it is undisputed ti1at: this.::'.· 
dition continued for over two weeks with const3l't i"cccil:-
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,']e school premises. 
The conduct of plaintiff in violating the provisions of 
:.>' co:itract and in repeatedly failing to protect the bui2ding 
;ft 8r the initial flooding occurred was a material breach 
::on plaintiff's obligation which justified defendant's ter-
iination from the project. Not only was that portion of the 
building which had already been worked on in jeopardy but in 
addition the remaining three-fifths of the project could have 
aiso been jeopardized by plaintiff's unprofessional conduct. 
Any owner of a building whether it be a school or a home 
should expect a roofer to protect his premises from damages 
and should not be expected to continue a relationship with a 
roofer which has caused damage to a building, disrupted the 
use of the b'.iilding, and who has taken no steps to adequately 
insure that future damage will not occur before the final roof-
ing can be applied. As a matter of law under circumstances 
soch as this and under clear contractual obligations a trial 
CJurt or appellate court must rule that a material breach has 
:naeed occurred. Voith v. Knapp-Stiles, Inc. 139 N.W.2d 781 
(Ct. App. Mich. 1966). 
The only remaining question in this case is whether the 
r:iaterial breach by plaintiff could be excused because of a 
·.·1aiver b. d f 
- Y e_enda.nt's agents. If such waiver did in fact 
·,,-.r,j..,... d r: ~ 
·-· - eien::rant-'" justification for terminating plaintiff 
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"'Ill 
would be eliminated and the material breach would be 
of no 
effect. 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts, §390, p. 835. A S Will bo 
discussed in the next section, however, t~e iss f 
' - ue 0 Waiver 
was not properly raised nor was there sufficient evidence tc 
show that any of defendant's agents who allegedly waived the 
contractual provision of sealing had such authority. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY ALLOWED PLAIN-
TIFF'S CLAIM OF WAIVER TO BE PRESENTED BE-
FORE THE JURY AND ERRONEOUSLY INSTRUCTED 
THE JURY. 
As previously stated the question of waiver only become' 
relevant when it is determined that plaintiff breached its 
obligation under the contract thereby justifying defendant i·. 
terminating plaintiff from the project. The theory of waive: 
was created during the second day of trial. A review of the 
record unquestionably shows that even plaintiff's attorney 
at the time of trial did not intend to rely upon a waiver 
theory. Rather, plain tiff believed that the actions of de· 
fendant' s agents had modified the original contract and ar· 
gued this theory to the court. It was not until the trial 
judge himself suggested waiver that the theory entered the 
trial. (Tr., p. 159). 
In spite of defendant's continued objections, testirnon; 
concerning the conversations with defendant's inspectnr a~ 
director of buildings and grounds was admitted befure:c cic~ 
-18-
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I 
I 
concerning alleged waiver of the contract provision Testimony 
i·ias prevalent throughout the entire trial. Defendant's coun-
sel objected throughout the trial that waiver was improper 
because it was not plead, no authority to waive had been 
shown, and it was a surprise to him since he was not pre-
pared on this issue. (Tr., pp. 310-311, 315, 325, 162). This 
court has repeatedly held that notice must be given to a party 
of the issues raised and they must be given an opportunity to 
meet them. Cheney v. Rucker, 3 81 P. 2d 86 (Utah 1963) . 
In conference with the court, defendant's counsel argued 
that waiver was improper since there was no showing that ei-
ther Mr. Jensen or Mr. Ririe could waive the provisions of 
llie contract. The trial court gave his opinion that such au-
lliority may be possible and then stated it was a matter of 
law to tell the jury. (Tr., p. 161). The jury was never told 
anything about authority. 
Throughout the record there is no showing whatsoever that 
either one of these agents had authority to waive the contrac-
~al requirements entered into between the Board of Education 
~d plaintiff. Mr. Ririe repeatedly stated that he received 
no authorization from the school board to waive the provision. 
ITr., pp. 45, 250-251). Ririe also testified that Jensen 
could 0 1 n ~ make statements modifying any procedure after it 
(Tr., p. 56). Jensen substan-
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l 
tiated this statement and testified that he could not 
van 
the terms of any contract including tl:.e sealing provision 
(Tr., p. 88). Even the trial court stated to plaintiff's 
attorney that proof of authority was necessary. The court 
said, "These oral modifications on the job you are going to 
have to prove his authority from the school board because t;, 
school board is a body politic and just not every Tom, Dict 
and Harry that gets out on a job has got authority to do it.' 
(Tr., pp. 154-155). 
Thus, the record is void of any affirmative evidence 
showing that Jensen or Ririe had authority fror:-, the schoo~ 
board to waive the sealing provisions even if it were assuw,,: 
that they made such statements. It was plaintiff's burden 
to show such authority if the doctrine of waiver was to be 
presented at trial. 92 C.J.S., Waiver, p. 1066. To consti-
tute a waiver there must be a clear statement of the intentlc 
of the party to relinquish a right and that statement m~t~ 
made by an agent having the authority to give such a waiver. 
Public Warehouses of Matanzas v. Fidelity and Deposit Compar.; 
77 F.2d 831 (2nd Cir. 1935). 
This Court in Campbell Building Company v. State R~ 
Commission stated a rule applicable to this public institu-
tion. This Court said: 
Any person doing business with the state 
by way of contract or otherwise must rake 
-20-
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r 
I notice of the limitations on the author-ity of the officers or agents of the state, 
since they may act only within the scope 
of their lawful powers. A state road en-
aineer cannot waive a provision in the 
;ontract that extra work, before it can 
be paid for, must have been authorized 
and the prices fixed by a work order in 
writing. 70 P.2d 857, 865 (1937). 
The rule is universal that the power to execute a con-
~r~ 2t or agreement does not grant authority to vary the agree-
ment after it has been executed, nor is the power to vary an 
agreement after execution inferred from a general power to 
make it. Ordinarily, the authority to make a contract does 
not authorize an agent to waive its conditions or otherwise 
~minish or discharge the obligations of the third person. 
3 Am.Jur.2d, Agency, §85, pp. 488-489. 
Therefore, neither the facts of this case nor the law 
would have supported submission of waiver to the jury since 
plaintiff failed in its burden of proof showing the elements 
necessary before waiver can be considered. The jury was accord-
ingly never asked to decide any specific question of whether 
the conduct of defendant's agents had waived any material 
breach which may have occurred. 
As stated supra it was error for the question of material 
b-e h t 
- ac o be submitted to the jury. Assuming arguendo, how-
ever' that such submission was proper, the trial court still 
-:~.".'-tc.: .. n'jidicial error when it submitted an instruction 
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on waiver to the jury where no question of waiver existed. 
The court instructed the jury as follows: 
A default in the performance of a con-
tract may be waived. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances where there is an existing 
actual breach of contract of a character 
going to the essence, the innocent party 
will, if he insists on performance not-
withstanding the breach, keep alive his 
own obligation to continue with perfor-
mance, with the result that the party at 
fault, even though having in the interval 
done nothing in reliance on a continuance 
of performance, may, if he sees fit, turn 
about and hold the innocent party to per-
form. In other words, a party may waive 
a breach by the other party and then be 
liable for his own subsequent breach. 
Although intent is necessary to effect a 
waiver of a breach of contract, it need 
not be shown by direct evidence; but if it 
appears to exist so as to mislead the ad-
versary, it works an estoppel. (Instruc-
tion No. 14, Tr., p. 100). 
The effect of this instruction could only be to confuse 
the jury into thinking that the discussions concerning the 
waiver had a direct effect upon whether a material breach ha: 
been committed by plaintiff as was requested in Interrogator; 
No. 1. (R., p. 130). 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico in reversing a judgme;.c 
based upon a similar type of instruction stated: 
The purpose of instructions is to enlighten 
the jury. The instructions should call the 
attention of the jury to the specific issues 
which it must determine and should embrace 
only statements of law to be applied in th~ 
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examination and determination of the issue. 
No statement shall be included in any in-
struction which is likely to confuse or 
mislead any member of the jury. E.t~brey v. 
Galetin, 418 P.2d 62 (N.M. 1966). See also 
Lund v. Mountain Fuel Supply Compan~3~ 
P.2d 633 (Utah 1961). 
The defendant-appellant submits that the giving of in-
struction 14 allowed the jury to conclude that waiver was an 
integral ?art of determining a material breach. The jury 
could have concluded that the statements purportedly made by 
Hr. Jensen and Mr. Ririe approving the procedure eliminated 
any material breach which had existed under the terms of the 
contract. The error with this assumption is that plaintiff 
failed to show any authority of Mr. Jensen or Mr. Ririe to 
waive the provisions and so any decision by the jury based 
upon waiver was improper since the issue, as a matter of law, 
could not be considered by the jury because of plaintiff 1 s 
failure to prove au th or i ty. 
The jury was thus prohibited from answering a specific 
question on waiver but was instructed erroneously as to the 
elements of waiver and the effect of waiver even though this 
issue was not properly before the jury. This allowed preju-
dicial evidence which was legally insufficient to influence 
the decision of the jury in its conclusion that a material 
8
reach had not occurred. 
lt is · ~pparent, therefore, that the issue of waiver was 
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extremely prejudicial to defendant in that it was: first, 
not properly plead so that defendant had notice of the d~ 
fense; second, witnesses were allowed to testify as to wai-
ver with no proof offered by plaintiff that such witnesses 
haC. authority to make any waivers; and third, an instructiot 
concerning waiver was given to the jury which could have r,o 
effect but to confuse them and to apply waiver erroneous0 
in determining a material breach. 
SUMHARY 
This action involved a complicated series of claims for 
breach and excuses and justifications. The trial court f~~ 
in its duty to separate these issues and to allow the jury 
only to decide legitimate questions of fact supported by su~­
stantial evidence. 
The trial court was obligated as a matter of law to fine 
that plaintiff had materially breached its contract with de-
fendant by failing to properly seal the roof and by all~i~ 
water damage to occur over a long period of time. It was er:· 
to submit this issue to the jury. 
Had this been done, the question of waiver could h~e 
been decided in a logical manner. The court, on the conclu-
sion of the case, could have decided whether there was sub-
stantial evidence to show that defendant's agents had aut;.c::· 
to make any claimed waivers. If such evidence exi steC. t:,c 
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. 1. court could submit the queition of waiver to the jury tria 
'ts factual determination. If such authority did not for l 
exist then the issue of waiver was void and a verdict could 
be directed in favor of defendant. 
Instead, the trial court refused to rule upon the ques-
tion of plaintiff's breach and submitted it instead to the 
jury. The court allowed evidence of waiver into the trial 
throughout the proceedings and then instructed the jury as 
to waiver although no specific question was before the jury. 
This procedure denied defendant the right to receive a 
ruling as a matter of law that plaintiff had breached its 
contract and instead forced the defendant to argue this com-
plicated issue before the jury. In addition, this procedure 
allowed the jury to hear legally insufficient evidence as to 
waiver and yet use this evidence in deciding material breach. 
For these reasons, defendant requests this Court to hold 
as a matter of law that plaintiff materially breached its 
contract with defendant by failing to comply with the con-
tractual provisions and to rule that the evidence presented 
at trial is insufficient for submission of waiver to a jury 
thereby mandating a judgment in favor of defendant. 
In the alternative, defendant would request a new trial 
be granted and that guidelines be issued as to the proper 
Procedure whicn the trial court should follow in separating 
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the various theories and defenses. l 
i 
ubmitted, i 
DUNN --
Attorney for ApFellant 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
CRAIG S. COOK 
Of Counsel 
3645 East 3100 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
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